The Stop Spam Calls Act Wants One-Seller Consent Back. The Fifth Circuit Already Moved the Other Way

What H.R. 10610 actually says#

Rep. Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA) introduced H.R. 10610 on 24 September 2026 with Rep. Jefferson Shreve (R-IN) and four other cosponsors. The House referred it to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

The bill is one operative section with three subsections. We read the introduced text on govinfo.gov and the sponsor's release on 10 Oct 2026.

• Subsection (a): within one year of enactment, the FCC must rewrite 47 CFR 64.1200(f)(9) to read as it appears in the FCC's final rule published 26 January 2024 (89 Fed. Reg. 5098).
• Subsection (b): the rewritten definition takes effect 18 months after enactment, so the earliest real date is a year and a half after a president signs it.
• Subsection (c), a rule of construction: nothing in the section shows the FCC lacked authority, before enactment, to require that prior express consent be in writing.
• Five consumer groups endorsed it in the release: Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, NACA, the National Consumer Law Center and the National Consumers League.

The definition the bill would bring back#

Prior express written consent is the FCC's term for the signed agreement a seller needs before sending marketing calls or texts with an autodialer or an artificial or prerecorded voice.

The FCC's 2024 order rewrote that definition in four ways. The table sets the current text, as eCFR carried it on 7 Oct 2026, against the 2024 text the bill names.

Why the 2024 version never took effect#

The 2024 order made the new definition effective on 27 January 2025, per the DATES line of FR Doc. 2023-28832. Three days before that, the Eleventh Circuit struck it down.

In Insurance Marketing Coalition v. FCC (No. 24-10277, 24 Jan 2025), the court vacated Part III.D of the order, the one-to-one and topic rules, for conflicting with the ordinary meaning of prior express consent.

• The test the court applied: a person need only clearly and unmistakably state, before the call, that they are willing to receive it. One-to-one consent is not required.
• The court quoted the FCC's own brief conceding a consumer could, in particular instances, agree to marketing robocalls from multiple named intermediaries.
• Its precedent list included Gorss Motels (11th Cir. 2019), where one franchise agreement gave fax permission to a hotel and its affiliates at once.
• The vacated text never took effect. eCFR still shows the pre-2024 definition, authorizing the seller, as of 7 October 2026.

Bradford: the Fifth Circuit drops the written part#

Radley Bradford put his cell number on a pest-control service agreement with Sovereign Pest Control of TX. He later received prerecorded calls asking him to schedule renewal inspections, and renewed four times.

He sued only for missing prior express written consent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company on 25 February 2026 (No. 24-20379, Chief Judge Elrod, with Judges Clement and Haynes).

• Section 227(b) says prior express consent. The word written is not there.
• The court read express consent through Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990): consent directly given, either viva voce or in writing. Viva voce means by word of mouth.
• No deference to the FCC: in enforcement proceedings courts read the statute themselves, citing McLaughlin Chiropractic v. McKesson (2025) and Loper Bright (2024).
• The core reasoning in the court's words: the statute provides no basis for concluding that telemarketing calls require prior express written consent but not oral consent.
• Bradford binds federal courts in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. Read in full from ca5.uscourts.gov on 10 Oct 2026.

The gap between the bill and Bradford#

Commentators framed H.R. 10610 as Congress answering Bradford (TCPAWorld, 7 Oct 2026). Read the bill text next to the regulation and the fit is looser than that.

What follows is a reading of the text, not a forecast. A court applying an enacted version could see it differently.

• The bill rewrites the definition in (f)(9). The rules that require written consent at all sit in 64.1200(a)(2) and (a)(3), and the bill does not touch them.
• Bradford held (a)(2)'s written requirement has no basis in section 227(b). A new definition of the term does not by itself supply that basis.
• Subsection (c) is a disclaimer: the bill should not be read as proof the FCC lacked authority. It does not grant authority in so many words.
• The clock is short. The 119th Congress ends on 3 January 2027, and a bill not enacted by then has to be reintroduced and start over.

What this changes for a B2B team texting on iMessage#

The federal written-consent rule applies only to marketing calls made with an autodialer or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Most of the practical risk for B2B senders sits elsewhere.

In Facebook v. Duguid (1 Apr 2021), the Supreme Court held an autodialer must store or produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator. That narrows section 227(b) a great deal.

• State law still asks for writing. Florida's 501.059(8)(a) requires prior express written consent for unsolicited telephonic sales calls involving automated selection and dialing of numbers or the playing of a recorded message.
• Pennsylvania's Act 47, from 18 Oct 2026, brings texts inside its solicitation rules and requires prior express written consent for robocalls on any residential, business or wireless line. Details at /blog/pennsylvania-act-47-text-messages.
• The Do Not Call exception in 64.1200(c)(2)(ii) needs a signed, written agreement naming the seller and the number. The bill does not touch that paragraph either.
• Section 227(b) covers calls using an autodialer or an artificial or prerecorded voice, so a recorded voice memo can bring a text inside it whatever the dialing method. See /blog/voice-memo-prerecorded-voice-tcpa.

A consent record that holds up under all three outcomes#

Three futures are live: the bill dies on 3 January 2027, the bill passes, or more circuits follow Bradford. One consent record works in all three, and it costs almost nothing extra to collect.

Consent that names one company and matches the topic of the form also produces the text a prospect expects to receive, which is the one they answer.

• Name one seller, your company, in the consent line. A form listing partners is exactly what the bill targets.
• Keep the topic tight. A demo request for a CRM tool covers texts about that tool, not about an affiliate's financing offer.
• Show a clear and conspicuous disclosure that the person agrees to marketing texts, including automated ones, and that agreeing is not a condition of purchase.
• Store the phone number, timestamp, page version and disclosure text with the contact, plus the E-SIGN signature event.
• Record verbal consent on calls too. In the Fifth Circuit it now counts, though a written record is still the stronger proof everywhere.
• Treat bought comparison-site leads as unconsented for automated or prerecorded sends until you can produce the form and the seller list behind them.

Where Blue Reacher sits in this#

Blue Reacher sends over iMessage, so no A2P registration is required. That is a carrier-registration fact, and it changes nothing about consent law.

We are a vendor in this category. Nothing here is legal advice, and every citation is dated so your counsel can check it.

• Pacing is published: no total daily message cap, replies are never metered, and new conversations pace at 50 opted-in or 30 cold new contacts per line per day.
• Opt-outs are handled on the line itself; the record of who consented to what stays yours. See /blog/tcpa-text-message-compliance-guide for the full checklist.
• For the FCC's 30 Sep 2026 opt-out order, which also changes consent mechanics, see /blog/fcc-opt-out-order-adopted-what-changed.

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